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   Reichpietschufer 50 • D-10785 Berlin • www.wzb.eu  Abstract 
This paper sets out to explore the black box of recent employment dynamics in Ger-
many and thus to identify positive and negative implications that might be of interest for 
future policymaking. The starting point of our analysis is the question as to whether 
recent employment growth in Germany is the result of labour market reforms or is 
instead a mere by-product of the general economic upswing. In order to tackle this ques-
tion, we assess German employment performance over the last ten years and also 
compare the determinants of the latest two economic upturns (1998–2000 and 2005–
2007). Guided by an analytical framework that stresses the complementarity of institu-
tions responding to shocks, we examine possible factors behind employment dynamics. 
The following step is to sum up and discuss the major aspects of the recent German 
labour market reforms (the so-called Hartz reforms). Taken together, our empirical evi-
dence indicates that the recent employment growth might indeed have been facilitated 
by the labour market reforms. The reforms have led to considerable improvements, but 




Das vorliegende Papier versucht die Hintergründe der aktuellen Beschäftigungsdynamik 
in Deutschland aufzudecken und Implikationen für die künftige Politikgestaltung zu 
identifizieren. Der Ausgangspunkt der Untersuchung liegt in der Frage, ob das aktuelle 
Beschäftigungswachstum in Deutschland das Ergebnis der jüngsten Arbeitsmarktrefor-
men oder lediglich ein Nebenprodukt des allgemeinen wirtschaftlichen Aufschwungs 
ist. Im Lichte dieser Problematik wird die deutsche Beschäftigungsperformanz der ver-
gangenen zehn Jahre beleuchtet; außerdem werden die Bestimmungsfaktoren der letzten 
beiden Aufschwünge (1998–2000 und 2005–2007) miteinander verglichen. Auf Grund-
lage eines analytischen Rahmens, der die Komplementarität von auf Schocks reagieren-
den Institutionen betont, werden mögliche Erklärungen für die aktuelle Beschäftigungs-
dynamik diskutiert. In einem weiteren Schritt werden die wichtigsten Punkte der jüngs-
ten deutschen Arbeitsmarktreformen (der sogenannten Hartz-Reformen) zusammenge-
fasst und diskutiert. Alles in allem zeigt die empirische Evidenz, dass das aktuelle Be-
schäftigungswachstum tatsächlich von den Arbeitsmarktreformen gestützt wurde. Die 
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 1. Introduction 
It is not long ago that Germany was considered the ‘ill man’ of Europe. In nearly every 
study ranking EU member states or OECD countries, Germany trailed the pack. The 
country seemed to be the prototype for an over-regulated labour market, the prototype 
for low growth dynamics, the prototype for low employment intensity of growth, and 
the prototype for a business-unfriendly bureaucracy. Today, though, Germany seems to 
be back on track:  
•  In 2006, for the first time, Germany was named one of the 20 most business-friendly 
bureaucracies in the world in the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business Indicator’. 
•  Economic growth was 2.9 percent both in 2006 and in the first half of 2007, thus sur-
passing for the first time the average growth rates of the 15 old EU member states. 
•  The employment intensity of economic growth has been high: 630,000 regular jobs 
were created in 2006, and 430,000 new jobs were created in the first half of 2007 
alone. 
•  Unemployment fell from 4.8 million in July 2005 to 3.4 million in October 2007. 
•  Most notably, the employment rates of older workers (aged 55–64) leaped from 37.2 
percent in 2000 to 52 percent in 2007. 
•  The government deficit of 3.6 percent in 2005 has been dissolved and is expected to 
amount to zero or even move into positive figures in 2008. 
Many claim that this success is the result of the recent labour market reforms – the so-
called Hartz reforms and the ‘Agenda 2010’ programme initiated by former Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder – while others maintain that it is due to the impact of additional 
reforms launched by the Grand Coalition government, especially those reforms pro-
posed by the conservative Christian Democrats. A third view sees the success as the 
result of the economic upswing, in other words, as the mere reflection of good luck, and 
many are still worried that Germany’s inability to tackle basic reforms will become 
apparent with the next downturn. 
It is impossible to untie this Gordian knot, and at the same time it would be of no 
help to cut through it like the famed Alexander the Great. Drawing conclusions requires 
at least some basic understanding of how the German model works. And even if the 
truth is that ‘there is no such model’, at least not of a consistent and stable kind, then 
there are certainly still general traits that provide clues as to ‘what works’ and ‘what 
does not work’ with regard to the creation of sustainable employment. 
The paper addresses this task proceeding in four steps. First, we present some 
indepth information about Germany’s employment performance over the last ten years. 
In a second step, we outline the possible factors behind success or failure against the 
background of an analytical framework, and we apply this framework to Germany by 
including an inventive assessment of its employment dynamics. The third section pro-
vides detailed information on the recent German labour market reforms and presents 
  3circumstantial evidence of their effectiveness. Finally, we suggest lessons that can be 
learned and we generalise our results on the basis of the analytical framework. 
 
 
2.  Stylised facts about the German employment performance 
Looking at employment rates in Germany, the old EU member states and the USA, it 
becomes evident that in terms of employment Germany is actually not doing so badly. 
Since 1997, the employment rate has risen by more than 5 percentage points and is 
slowly approaching the U.S. level. In comparison with other EU-15 countries, Ger-
many’s rate slightly exceeds the average (Figure 1, Appendix). However, the overall 
employment rate is only one of many indicators that measure employment performance. 
This section, therefore, briefly outlines the broader picture of employment-related indi-
cators in Germany. 
When we look at unemployment rates, the comparison between Germany, the EU 
and the USA turns out quite differently. For the last ten years, Germany has been 
exhibiting significantly higher unemployment rates than both the EU-15 and the USA 
(Figure 2, Appendix).
1 Closer inspection reveals that the most problematic features in 
Germany are the high share of long-term unemployment (more than 50 percent of the 
unemployed have not worked for more than a year) and the concentration of unemploy-
ment in eastern Germany and some regions in the northwest of Germany, especially.
2
The risk of unemployment is also unevenly distributed according to social group. 
Looking at gender, women surprisingly have slightly lower unemployment rates than 
men, although this trend only turned round during the last decade. Education is now the 
most important determinant of individual unemployment. In 2005, unemployment rates 
were exorbitantly high among unskilled workers and considerably lower for persons 
with secondary education (Figure 3, Appendix). Among persons with tertiary education, 
unemployment rates were below 5 percent. The skill gap is even more sharply reflected 
in Germany’s employment rates. Whereas between 80 percent and 90 percent of highly 
skilled people are employed, only between 40 percent and 70 percent of the low skilled 
have a job; at 54.1 percent (for the 25–64 age group), Germany is among the low per-
formers in this respect. 
                                                 
1  The reader should bear in mind that dealing with unemployment figures can be treacherous in 
international comparisons, especially because of different counting methods. The official German 
figures are based on registration at the public employment service, which includes, for instance, 
unemployed people working less than 15 hours a week. According to the strict ILO concept, which – 
for instance – does not count people as unemployed if they work regularly at least one hour per week, 
the seasonally adjusted unemployment figure in June 2007 was only 2.65 million, and the corres-
ponding unemployment rate 6.3 percent, compared to 3.81 million (or 9.1 percent) according to the 
registration concept. 
2  Breaking down Germany’s regions into the approximately 180 administrative units of the public 
employment service, the unemployment rate gap ranged from 4.3 percent in Freising (near Munich) 
to 24.1 percent in Sangerhausen (Sachsen-Anhalt in eastern Germany) in 2005. 
  4 The focus on particular age groups is endorsed by the European Employment Stra-
tegy (EES), which has set specific numerical benchmarks to be attained by all member 
states. By 2010, total employment rates should exceed 70 percent, while the employ-
ment rates of people aged 55–64 should surpass 50 percent. The EES did not set quan-
titative targets for young adults, however, because differences in youth employment are 
mainly related to the diversity of educational systems. 
As regards older employees, employment rates have increased significantly during 
recent years. Due to extensive use of early pension options during the 1990s, the rate of 
employment for 55–64 year-olds dropped to 38 percent in 1999. By 2006, this figure 
had risen by 10 percentage points, most recently even exceeding the Lisbon goal and 
surpassing the EU-15 average (Figure 4, Appendix). 
Employment has expanded remarkably in Germany as stated at the beginning of 
this paper, but what kind of jobs has been created? How far is the argument justified 
that the quantity target is achieved at the cost of job quality, favouring the creation of 
often inadequately insured ‘atypical’ jobs (such as marginal, part-time or temporary 
employment) instead of ‘regular’ jobs subject to social security contributions? The data 
for the last decade show that the number of standard employment relationships indeed 
declined in Germany. As indicated above, however, this trend was reversed during the 
most recent upswing (Figure 5, Appendix). 
Looking at self-employment, the Hartz reforms sought to render this employment 
option broadly accessible. A new self-employment grant – called ‘Ich-AG’ – was estab-
lished to this end (see Section 3). Since the introduction of the measure in 2003, self-
employment has increased remarkably. As for employees with fixed-term contracts, it 
can be said that temporary employment as a form of non-standard employment is on the 
rise, as is part-time employment. Part-time employees already represent one quarter of 
all employees, and there is an evident upward trend (Figure 5, Appendix). 
Along with the introduction of the Hartz reforms, the legal parameters of marginal 
employment have been overhauled as well. The overarching goal was to open up new 
job opportunities within the marginal employment sector so as to increase the incentive 
to take up gainful employment. A distinction was made between ‘mini-jobs’ and ‘midi-
jobs’. Mini-jobs are defined as employment with monthly earnings of up to € 400, 
whereas midi-jobs refer to monthly wages of between € 400 and € 800. Analysing the 
numbers of midi-jobbers over recent years, it emerges that marginal employment is on 
the rise, both in terms of exclusive and sideline jobs (Figure 6, Appendix). 
The Hartz reforms were not only about creating more jobs, but about creating jobs 
entailing coverage under the social security scheme. However, since social security con-
tributions in Germany are paid by employers and employees in equal measure, there is a 
trade-off. On the one hand, it is common sense that as many employees as possible 
should be covered by social security and that the social security funds should take in as 
many contributions as possible. On the other hand, employees are reluctant to take up 
marginal jobs that are subject to social security contributions, for contributions dispro-
portionately reduce their gross incomes. 
  5The concept of midi-jobs was introduced in order to do justice to both of these two 
conflicting goals. Midi-jobs are marginal employment relationships with monthly earn-
ings of between € 400 and € 800. Unlike regular employment relationships, the share of 
social security contributions paid by the employee is not a fixed percentage, rather 
varies – according to monthly earnings – between 4 and 21.5 percent. Since their intro-
duction in 2003, the number of midi-jobs has grown constantly (Figure 6, Appendix), 
and the overwhelming majority have been occupied by women. 
Finally, the increasing share of non-standard employment related to total employ-
ment is also reflected in labour productivity. Compared to the 1980s and early 1990s, 
when Europe had equal or even higher productivity growth rates than the USA, the 
dynamic of labour productivity per hour has weakened considerably over the last 
decade. On average between 1997 and 2006, labour productivity per hour increased 
only by 1.5 percent in the old EU-15 and by 1.6 percent in Germany compared with 2.4 
percent in the USA. 
So is there necessarily a trade-off between employment growth and productivity as 
this last evidence seems to suggest? The aim of the following section is to examine this 
question and to discuss possible determinants. 
 
 
3.  An analytical framework and possible determinants 
Learning lessons from the experience of one country requires some kind of theoretical 
model, especially if countries with very different cultures and levels of economic devel-
opment are compared. This is, however, not the place to outline such a model at any 
length.
3 The following figure is only a brief and superficial sketch of a possible analytic-
cal framework and its main propositions. 
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3  For more details, see Chapter 2 in Schmid (2002) and Chapter 3 in Schmid (forthcoming). 
  6 As the analytical framework indicates, employment dynamics are the result of a com-
plex set of labour market and product market institutions responding to external as well 
as internal shocks. Whether their responses are successful or not in terms of sustainable 
employment growth and corresponding prosperity ultimately depends on their fit to the 
external environment. The debate on optimal institutions is dominated by two particular 
schools of thought. One the one hand, the regulation school argues that the market has 
to be domesticated by law and state intervention. On the other, the deregulation school 
advocates free markets and objects to any intervention, with the exception of minimum 
standards and measures to mitigate poverty. We introduce this framework accompanied 
by the proposition that both schools are one-sided and that ‘flexicurity systems’ based 
on complementary institutions are a more appropriate structure. This proposition is 
based on four central assumptions. 
First, institutions – considered, very generally, as commonly acknowledged rules of 
behaviour (North 1991) – not only restrict individual or collective agents in their acti-
vities (negative freedom), but also enable individual and collective agents to interact or 
to cooperate successfully (positive freedom), especially by providing material and legal 
infrastructure. Institutions thereby extend the expectation horizon of agents by means of 
mutual trust, collectively usable resources and the guarantee of a safety net. For in-
stance, employment regulation – through health and safety standards, restriction of child 
labour, minimum wage settings, employment protection by means of prohibition of un-
fair dismissals and discrimination, and mandatory contributions to unemployment, 
health and pension insurance – can alter the incentives of employers in a favourable 
way. Under a carefully regulated system, the interest of employers lies in improving 
workforce productivity by adopting safety and health standards, for instance, and by 
training workers. And because the rules hold for all employers and are enforced by the 
state, there is no possibility of cut-throat competition by means of drastic reductions in 
quality standards. On the other hand, the existence of a universal safety net also relieves 
employers of a quasi-feudal type of responsibility for their employees and enables them 
to adjust the size of their workforces according to economic necessity. 
On the supply side, labour law recognises the bargaining power disadvantage of 
most workers compared to employers by ensuring individual rights such as maximum 
working hours, entitlement to vacations and training, and collective rights such as free-
dom of association and collective bargaining. Under such carefully regulated systems, it 
is in the employees’ own interest to cooperate with fellow workers, to be loyal to the 
employer and to reveal their preferences by voice and not by exit. Moreover, social 
security regulations, as well as universal vocational and educational standards, improve 
the ability of employees to contribute to functional flexibility and, if necessary, to 
regional mobility. 
Second, continuous economic and social change (the external and internal ‘shocks’ 
in our framework) requires institutions that are able to quickly adjust to new situations 
and uncertainties. State regulation is too inflexible to this end. ‘Flexicurity systems’, 
therefore, are characterised by negotiated flexibility and negotiated security (Schmid 
2007), which leaves the social partners, non-governmental organisations and other civil 
  7agencies or decentralised governmental agencies substantial scope for self-regulation in 
setting wages, employment and environmental standards on both the labour and product 
markets. If there is one common element in the European Social Model in general, and 
among the successful European employment systems in particular, the most prominent 
feature is the ‘social dialogue’ in industrial relations (Freeman 2006). Apart from the 
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands as obvious strong cases in participatory 
economic democracy, the recovery in Germany’s employment dynamics to a large ex-
tent can be traced back to the basically still intact strengths of social partnership. Even 
the UK can be cited as good practice for social partnership in relation to the successful 
implementation of a National Minimum Wage (Metcalf 2007). 
Germany provides an important example of negotiated security especially with res-
pect to vocational qualification standards that enhance (following successful bargaining 
eventually legalised by the state) labour market transparency and occupational mobility. 
As far as negotiated flexibility is concerned, the deep involvement of German em-
ployers and trade unions in the apprenticeship system is still an asset in ensuring that 
skills are flexibly adapted to market needs. Even if one has to acknowledge increasing 
skill deficits in Germany (especially at the level of engineering and other high-tech 
skills), it is important to note the high presence and visibility of the social partners at the 
local and regional level in Germany. This feature – and this is of particular interest for 
developing countries – not only ensures that small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in rural areas are endowed with marketable skills, it also prevents young people 
from migrating (too early) into the large cities where the wages, but also the risk of un-
employment, might be higher. It is also important to note that social partnership is play-
ing an important role in harmonising (or at least furthering the mutual acceptance of) 
vocational or professional standards between EU member states. This not only fosters 
international labour mobility, but also the international competitiveness of SMEs. 
Third, there is not one optimal ‘flexicurity system’, rather there are several possible 
combinations depending on the state of economic and technological development, on 
the local culture and on other historical predispositions. ‘Flexicurity Legoland’ Den-
mark, for instance, so highly praised these days as a best-practice model, represents just 
one possibility among others. Based on the so-called ‘golden triangle’, the Danish 
labour market is characterised, first, by high job turnover made possible through low job 
security; second, by a generous welfare system, especially in the form of high unem-
ployment benefits; third, by an active labour market policy aimed at enhancing employ-
ability and thereby employment security, especially through education and training 
measures.
4 However, the Danish flexicurity system can certainly not serve as a blueprint 
for all European countries. Three aspects that might prevent other countries from imi-
tating this model have to be emphasised: first, high budgetary costs based on excessi-
vely high taxes;
5 second, long-established relationships of trust between the social part-
                                                 
4  The best references for the Danish model are Bredgaard and Larsen (2005) and Madsen (2006). 
5  These, incidentally, led to tax evasion, which was reflected in a high share of illegal work, as the 
European Commission most recently reported on the basis of Eurobarometer surveys (Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, October 10, 2007, p. 22). 
  8 ners; and, third, a high average skill level among workers combined with a production 
system dominated by SMEs. 
Nevertheless, even if the Danish flexicurity system seems to be an outstanding 
model, and for the developing countries may even represent a kind of utopia, it contains 
messages that can be generalised and adapted to other countries. One of these messages 
is that high external flexibility can be traded in against high income security in the case 
of intermittent unemployment, as well as against high public investment in the employ-
ability of workers through vocational education and training measures. The lesson from 
the German counterpart is that low external flexibility can be traded in against high 
internal numerical and functional flexibility. An essential element of the German suc-
cess is the fact that the German trade unions as well as the German works councils have 
negotiated many collective agreements at sectoral or firm level in which employees can 
trade in working-time flexibility (for instance, through long-term working-time ac-
counts)
6 and even wage flexibility for employment security.
7
Fourth, sustainable employment dynamics depend on a combination of demand- 
and supply-side policies. Without effective demand, supply-side strategies will dry up 
or lead to high unemployment or underemployment, and without employable supply, 
demand-side strategies will fall short or lead to wage inflation. The new growth theory 
(Aghion et al. 1999) provides persuasive arguments and empirical evidence that educa-
tion & skills combined with high technology & capital is the most important driver for 
sustainable employment dynamics. In addition, the theory of spatial economics (Krug-
man 1991) draws attention to the fact that in the long run, equal distribution of invest-
ment among regions and social groups is more effective than aiming these investments 
at only a few localities or specific social classes. One reason that Germany is lagging 
behind the USA for productivity growth rates is the slow diffusion of new information 
and communication technology, which, in turn, is the consequence of unequal distribu-
tion of investment in education and technology. 
In a nutshell, we argue that employment is the outcome of interactions between 
labour supply and labour demand. Supply and demand are constantly exposed to exter-
nal and internal shocks, and these shocks are absorbed by the interactions of thousands 
of agents guided by institutions. How did the German employment system react to these 
shocks? 
3.1  Recent employment boom: a result of successful reform or merely induced by 
the economic upturn? 
There is an ongoing debate about the driving forces behind the recent employment 
growth in Germany. Some people claim that the recent employment miracle and the 
                                                 
6  See, for instance, Wotschack and Hildebrandt (2007). 
7  For a discussion of the strategy of ‘flexicurity’, which the European Commission has adopted as an 
overarching guideline for the European Employment Strategy (EES), see Auer (2007), European 
Commission (2006, 2007) and Schmid (2002, 2007, forthcoming). 
  9visible decline in unemployment are the result of the Hartz reforms. Others maintain 
that the favourable situation has nothing to do with these reforms. On the contrary. They 
argue that the recent increase in employment is weaker than in the last economic up-
swing (1998–2000), and that the decreasing unemployment rates are nothing but the 
result of a demographically induced shrinking of labour force supply. For the time 
being, there is no reliable empirical analysis offering support for either of the two com-
peting perspectives. Even the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigen-
rat) is at loggerheads over this question. Drawing on detailed descriptive data, the 
majority of the council holds the view that the Hartz reforms are likely to have brought 
about a positive employment effect, while a minority vote, namely, Peter Bofinger, has 
presented his own calculations supporting the view that the recent employment growth 
is merely a consequence of the general economic upswing. According to him, the rosy 
picture is the result of ‘an extraordinarily dynamic world economy’. In the same vein, 
he maintains that the fall in unemployment is caused by demographic change as well as 
new ‘make-work’ measures under labour market policy (Sachverständigenrat 2007, 
pp. 325–343). 
To shed more light on this important question, we carry out a simple but powerful 
empirical exercise which consists in breaking employment dynamics down into its main 
determinants. Decomposing GDP per capita into productivity per hour (efficiency indi-
cator), working hours per employed person (work-sharing component), employment 
rate per working-age population (behavioural component indicating the degree of labour 
market integration), and working-age population related to total population (demo-
graphic component) allows us to compare economic growth within the two latest up-
swings (1998–2000 and 2005–2007) and, hence, enables us to open to some extent the 
black box of employment dynamics (Table 1).
8
Table 1: Decomposition of the yearly change in economic growth into indicators of 
efficiency, work-sharing, labour market integration and population structure, 
1998–2000 and 2005–2007 
   
  ∆ln(GDP/P) =  ∆ln(GDP/H) + ∆ln(H/E) + ∆ln(E/WAP) + ∆ln(WAP/P) 
   
1998–2000  2.31 =  1.83  +  –1.02  + 1.78 +  –0.28 
2005–2007  2.99 =  2.71  +  –1.08  + 2.50 +  –1.13 
   
 
GDP/P  = Gross Domestic Product per Capita (basis: current prices, current PPPs) 
GDP/H  = Gross Domestic Product per Hour 
H/E  = Working Time per Employed Person 
E/WAP  = Employment Rate 
WAP/P  = Working-Age Population related to Population 
Sources: Sachverständigenrat (2007); Statistisches Bundesamt (2006, 2007); authors’ calculations. For 
the raw data (explaining small rounding errors in this table), see Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix. 
                                                 
8  For the original figures, see Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix. 
  10 The average annual growth rates of GDP per capita are almost the same in the two 
periods: 2.31 percent in the 1998 to 2000 period, and 2.99 percent between 2005 and 
2007. In both periods, working time per employed person decreased further at the same 
rate, thus contributing negatively to economic welfare per capita. In both periods, the 
demographic change had a negative impact, albeit much more so in the more recent 
period. In both periods, these negative factors were more than compensated by pro-
ductivity growth and the greater activity of the working-age population, hence, by a 
rising employment rate. The more recent period, however, was in both respects – labour 
market efficiency and labour market integration – significantly more favourable.  
This evidence seems to support the more optimistic view shared by the majority of 
the German Council of Economic Experts. In order to make the assessment more solid, 
we cast a glance at the components of volume of work per capita (H/P), which increased 
in both periods, albeit more slowly during the recent economic upswing (0.28 percent 
per annum compared to 0.49 percent between 1998 and 2000) (Table 2). 
Table 2: Decomposition of the yearly change in per-capita working time into indica-
tors of working-time preference, utilisation of the workforce, labour market 
inclusiveness and demographic structure, 1998–2000 and 2005–2007 
   
  ∆ln(H/P) =  ∆ln(H/E) +  ∆lnE/(E+U) + ∆ln(E+U)/WAP +∆ln(WAP/P) 
   
1998–2000 0.49  =  –1.02  +  0.61  +  1.17  + –0.28 
2005–2007 0.28  =  –1.08  +  1.35  +  1.14  + –1.13 
   
 
H/P  = Working Time per Capita 
H/E  = Working Time per Employed Person 
E/(E+U)  = Utilisation of Active Labour Force (U=Unemployment) 
(E+U)/WAP  = Labour Force Participation Rate 
WAP/P  = Working-Age Population related to Population 
Sources: Sachverständigenrat (2007), Statistisches Bundesamt (2006, 2007), authors’ calculations. For the raw data 
(explaining small rounding errors in this table), see Tables 1 and 3 in the Appendix.  
As expected from the previous analysis, the contribution of working time per employed 
person to the volume of work was substantially negative in both periods. The same is 
true of the demographic component, but the negative contribution was much higher in 
the recent period (–1.13 percent per annum versus –0.28 percent between 1998 and 
2000). Thus, for demographic reasons, one would have expected much slower growth in 
the volume of work in the most recent period. In order to clarify why the discrepancy is 
lower than expected, two other components of the volume of work need to be investi-
gated, namely, labour force participation and utilisation of the active labour force. It 
turns out that the behavioural component – labour force participation – is of the same 
positive size in both periods. Hence, the answer lies in the utilisation rate of the active 
labour force, which is much higher in the ongoing upswing. 
  11Again, the analysis adds another piece of circumstantial evidence in favour of the 
view that the Hartz reforms improved labour market efficiency. Two arguments might 
contradict this conclusion: first, productivity growth slowed down due to higher labour 
force activity; and, second, the higher utilisation of the labour force is a result of ‘make-
work’ measures under labour market policy. However, the first argument is not con-
vincing: productivity growth was higher in the recent period than during the previous 
upswing. The second argument has more plausibility given that the average number of 
people in ‘make-work’ measures was slightly higher in the recent period than in the 
former period.
9  
Our first empirical outline has shown that there is some – albeit not very strong – 
circumstantial evidence of a positive impact based on the Hartz reforms. The following 
section looks at various possible explanations viewed from the perspective of analytical 
framework in order to gain some insight into which parts of the Hartz reforms might 
positively affect the employment dynamics. 
3.2  Possible factors explaining German employment dynamics: external and 
internal shocks or institutional misfit?  
As the analytical framework suggests, employment is determined by many factors. We 
can only briefly touch upon the main factors by relating them to German peculiarities, 
on the one hand, and by explaining the related empirical evidence in theoretical terms, 
on the other. We will come back to a more generalised view in the final section of this 
paper and will try there to formulate possible lessons.  
(1) Starting with ‘external shocks’, globalisation generally increases competition and 
forces the German economy to restructure. However, two German peculiarities are of 
interest here. First, due to the establishment of the euro zone, Germany has lost its 
sovereignty in the field of monetary and fiscal policy, which has consequently led to a 
loss of influence in the realm of employment policy. Unlike, for instance, the UK or 
Sweden, German governments are no longer able to make use of common instruments 
such currency devaluation in order to become more competitive in foreign trade. The 
appliance of Keynesian demand management is restricted by the Maastricht Treaty’s 
Growth and Stability Pact. Second, the tremendous costs of German reunification need 
to be taken into account. The restructuring of the former East German command eco-
                                                 
9  We include under ‘make-work’ measures job-creation schemes that are not precisely comparable 
between the two periods. The public employment service reports for the years 1998 to 2000 a yearly 
average of 274,000 persons in ‘Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen’ (job-creation measures). The figures 
under the same label between 2005 and 2007 are in the order of about 320,000 persons. The bulk of 
these ‘Arbeitsgelegenheiten’ (work opportunities), however, has a higher turnover than the former 
measures  (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen). Only a rigorous comparison of transition rates from 
‘make-work’ employment to ‘regular’ employment could decide whether the slightly higher level in 
the recent period is improving or damaging the employment dynamics in the long run; such a study 
does not exist. 
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10 which is still in progress, as well as the fiscal adjustment to the Growth and 
Stability Pact, have led to a dramatic decrease of public investment in Germany (from 
about 3.5 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP), which was at the very root of plummeting 
employment in the first half of this decennium. 
(2) There are also ‘internal shocks’ that can be summed up by another ‘megatrend’, 
namely individualisation – demographic change provoking an ‘ageing of society’, a 
small but slowly increasing migration within and between EU member states, and a 
shift in work preferences reflected in a steady rise of women’s labour force participa-
tion. Its impact on German employment and employment policy is threefold. First, a 
paradigm shift, with the abandonment of early retirement and the extension of working 
life at least up to the age of 67, has taken place, but is differentiated by growing divers-
ity in terms of preferences and abilities. Second, the issue of the work-life balance, most 
notably the compatibility of family life and working life, is becoming more and more 
important. Employment policy has to be modified in the direction of a life-course policy 
and must tackle the problem of the compressed working careers of young adults who 
need to comply with different social roles at the same time. Third, in line with the prin-
ciple of ‘freedom of mobility’, the EU-15 countries are opening their borders to the new 
member states in Central and Eastern Europe. From the perspective of the new member 
states, the emigration of the highly skilled is leading to a ‘brain drain’, which is a highly 
unfavourable situation for aspiring economies. From the viewpoint of the old member 
states, immigration increases competition and triggers social tensions. 
(3) Wages are, from the employers’ point of view, an important cost factor. This might 
depress demand for labour and provide incentives to substitute labour with capital. 
From the employees’ point of view, however, wages are the central income factor, 
which increases demand for goods and services and thereby employment. Moreover, 
wages are also an incentive factor for both employees and employers. Efficiency wage 
theory claims that employees work harder and are more cooperative if they receive good 
and fair wages; and employers invest more in education and training if they have to pay 
high wages. The balance between these two sides of the sword is difficult to achieve 
and has to be constantly renegotiated betwen the social partners. This is the reason why 
the state does not interfere in wage bargaining; the autonomy of the social partners is 
even constitutionally legitimised in Germany and not contested by any of the major 
political parties. However, for various reasons, the power of German trade unions has 
weakened considerably during the last two decades. This again is one of the reasons 
why wage costs have remained moderate. The annual growth rates of real average 
wages per full-time and full-year equivalent dependent employees have been below the 
average of most EU member states during the last ten years (OECD Employment Out-
look 2007, Table I). 
                                                 
10  Since 1990, annual net transfers from western to eastern Germany amounted to about 100 billion 
euros, which is about 40 percent of GDP; in other words, eastern Germany produces only about 
60 percent of its GDP in expenditure terms. Average labour productivity in eastern Germany is still 
only 79 percent of the western German level. 
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Germany as problematic. From the point of view of the neighbouring trading partners, 
wage moderation is considered a ‘beggar-my-neighbour policy’; from a Keynesian per-
spective, wage moderation is accused of depressing effective internal demand. It is for 
this very reason that Germany is at the same time both a champion in exporting and a 
champion of low growth related to employment-intensive services on the local and 
regional market. Germany is one of the few EU member states without a legally man-
dated minimum wage, an issue that is hotly debated. Minimum wages have been estab-
lished by the government for sectors that are increasingly exposed to international com-
petition and migration. Industries such as construction, roofing, painting and building 
cleaning are subject to minimum wage regulations. Depending on the specific industry, 
the mandatory minimum wage varies between € 6 and € 12 per hour.
11 However, since 
the basic security transfer (‘Arbeitslosengeld II’, see below) represents a de facto 
minimum income, more and more people are faced with a situation in which their job 
pays them less than state transfers would. In fact, there are sectors with standard wages 
of only € 3 per hour.
12 In order to uphold incentives for gainful employment, wages that 
fall below the ‘basic security’ limit are topped up by social transfers.
13
(4) In general, Germany is considered an overly regulated country. As far as labour 
market regulation is concerned, international comparisons such as the Economic Free-
dom of the World Index, show that Germany is indeed ranked at the upper end of the 
scale. And yet the Hartz reforms did bring about some deregulation, especially in rela-
tion to temp-agency work and business start-ups. The partial opening of the labour mar-
ket had positive effects such as an increase in both self-employment and temp-agency 
work. The flip-side of the coin, however, is the low coverage of the self-employed 
under social security schemes, as well as misuse of temp-agency work by employers in 
terms of dumping wages and not caring about their workers’ long-term job perspectives. 
As regards dismissal protection, little change can be reported. Apart from the fact 
that the German trade unions and the majority of the Social Democratic Party (and even 
some Christian Democrats) strongly oppose change, both empirical evidence and 
theoretical arguments suggest that job protection might have no negative employment 
effects if it is set in the proper institutional context, for example, if combined with voca-
tional education and training, with internal working-time flexibility and – maybe – with 
corresponding wage flexibility (see, for instance, OECD 2007a, Chapter 2). 
(5) Many claim that the welfare state is the main cause of Germany’s employment 
problems. This argument has two facets: First, work does not pay when seen in com-
                                                 
11  For up-to-date information on minimum wage regulations in Germany see Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, 
WSI-Tarifarchiv www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-3D0AB75D-54374908/hbs/hs.xsl/275.html (con-
sulted 23.10.2007). 
12  Extraordinarily low wages are paid in industries such as hairdressing, floristry, transportation and 
security. Depending on the region, standard wages for hairdressers start at 3.05 euro/hour. 
13  The British national minimum wage (NMW) introduced in 1997 and implemented by the Low Pay 
Commission (LPC) – proportionally composed of representatives of the employers, the trade unions 
and academics – is considered as good practice since it improved the situation of low-income earners 
(equity) without having a negative impact on employment (efficiency) (see Metcalf 2007).  
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tributions) are too high and impede job creation, particularly in the low-wage sector. For 
many low-wage earners, especially for non-working families with children, the gap 
between social transfers and possible wage incomes was indeed not ‘making work pay’. 
This fact explains to some extent the poor employment rates of low-skilled people, and 
possibly also the increasing amount of informal and illegal ‘black’ work. The Hartz 
reforms altered this situation to some extent by reducing welfare payments (especially 
for the long-term unemployed), on the one hand, and by improving the possibilities for 
earning in addition to welfare payments, on the other. With respect to non-wage costs, 
there is evidence that the creation of jobs in wage-intensive services (e.g., household, 
retail, hotel and restaurant services) was blocked or retarded (Scharpf and Schmidt 
2000). 
(6) Inefficient active labour market policies, specifically weak placement services and 
falsely targeted employment-promotion measures, are likely to induce low employment 
dynamics or permanent long-term unemployment. Germany was one of the highest 
spenders in terms of active labour market policy in the 1990s, first and foremost due to 
the transformation of the former East German command economy into a market eco-
nomy. In this period, employment fell dramatically in eastern Germany and unemploy-
ment rocketed to a level of up to 35 percent in some regions due to the privatisation of 
state enterprises, drastic cuts in the bureaucratic state sector and lack of private invest-
ment. In such transition periods, bridging measures under active labour market policy in 
the form of large-scale temporary public jobs or wage subsidies can play an important 
positive role, especially when they are combined with public and private capital invest-
ments in regional restructuring or development. Many developing countries, especially 
those with ‘socialist’ experiments, face an overly large public sector or nationalised in-
dustry. The few evaluation studies carried out during the transition period in eastern 
Germany in the 1990s, therefore, may have more lessons to teach for developing coun-
tries than the most recent labour market reforms, which are particularly affected by the 
specifics of highly industrialised (OECD) countries.
14  
In fact, however, temporary public jobs, employment subsidies, short-time allow-
ances, and partly also continuous vocational education and training measures were often 
misused in order to park people in measures or to ‘prepare’ them for early retirement. 
This was the reason for modernising the public employment service (PES) and for cut-
ting or redressing active measures by means of the Hartz reforms. 
(7) As the high unemployment and the low employment figures of low-skilled people 
show, vocational education and training policies play a crucial role in employment 
performance. And yet, unlike most of the EU member states, Germany’s youth unem-
ployment rates are still favourable, although they have recently been disimproving. The 
historically well-established apprenticeship system based on the combination of prac-
tical learning in firms and formal learning in schools (the ‘dual system’) is the main 
                                                 
14  Brinkmann (1995), Rabe (2000) and Wiedemann et al. (1999) provide the best reviews on labour 
market policy experiences in eastern Germany. 
  15reason why most young adults in Germany still manage the complicated transition from 
school to work, except for those with extraordinarily low skills and school drop-outs. In 
particular, young migrants are for the most part excluded from this system and are thus 
of great concern for current policy reforms (see, for instance, OECD 2007b, Chapter A, 
Indicator A6). 
(8) Finally, the political economy may also play a role. Germany, for instance, has a 
strong federal system, on the one hand, which gives each of the 16 individual states 
(Länder) a high degree of freedom to run their economy and education systems; on the 
other hand, the unemployment insurance system is centralised, so that high unemploy-
ment regions – especially in eastern Germany – are cross-subsidised by low unemploy-
ment regions, found especially in the south of Germany. In addition, Germany has, in 
contrast for instance to the UK, a proportional voting system which favours voters with 
preferences for generous unemployment benefits. This feature is emphasised by the fact 
that Germany’s system of vocational education and training favours firm-specific skills 
in contrast to generalised skills. This in turn increases workers’ interest in income re-
distribution as a social insurance device, in general, and in job protection or status-
preserving unemployment benefits, in particular (Cusack et al. 2006). 
The following section digs a little deeper into the current German labour market reforms 
by evaluating them against the background of the proposed analytical framework. 
 
 
4.  German employment policy: the major reforms 
The Hartz reforms were adopted in 2003 and 2004. At the core of these reforms were a 
series of fundamental reforms of the PES based on proposals put forward by the 2002 
Hartz Commission on ‘modernizing employment services’ (Hartz et al. 2002). In addi-
tion, two types of non-standard employment were promoted – self-employment and 
marginal jobs. In the following, the major elements of these reforms will be briefly de-
scribed and assessed.
15
(1) The new start-up subsidy (in Germany also called the ´Ich-AG´) supplemented the 
already existing bridging allowance, which capitalised unemployment benefit entitle-
ments in order to support the unemployed in setting up their own businesses. Whereas 
the individual amount of bridging allowance was derived from the unemployment bene-
fit plus a lump sum of € 300 per month for social insurance and was paid for only six 
months, the Ich-AG subsidy was paid as a yearly decreasing lump sum for three years, 
provided that the recipient’s annual income did not exceed € 25,000. The risk associated 
with self-employment was cushioned by the fact that eligibility for unemployment bene-
fits persisted for a period as long as four years. 
The take-up of the start-up subsidy was much higher than expected, and against 
certain initial reservations, it did not replace the bridging allowance. In addition, from 
                                                 
15  Unless indicated otherwise, the empirical evidence is based on the first evaluation report of the Hartz 
reforms (Bundesministerium 2006). 
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pendent employed person is an attractive option, since dismissal protection does not 
apply to this category of workers. Furthermore, bureaucratic thresholds for employment 
creation were loosened: all business start-ups had the option of hiring additional 
employees on the basis of fixed-term contracts for up to four years. 
Regarding the security dimension, minimum income security was provided in the 
form of a monthly allowance of € 600 in the first year, € 360 in the second year, and € 
240 in the third year. Concerning social security, it is important to note that in contrast 
to regular self-employment, social insurance was obligatory as long as the Ich-AG 
founders were in receipt of the corresponding allowance. Although at first sight the Ich-
AG seemed to provide the founder with minimum income security for three years, from 
the second year on the allowance only sufficed to cover the cost of social security 
contributions. 
Even though evaluation research has given credit to this component of the Hartz 
reforms, the Ich-AG scheme was abolished in 2006 and merged with the even more 
efficient bridging allowance to create an overall ‘Start-up Allowance’ for the unem-
ployed. The new regulation tightened the conditions and excluded most of the long-term 
unemployed from the programme; this alone brought about a decline in the cases pro-
moted from about 300,000 to 200,000 (Baumgartner and Caliendo 2007). 
(2) As mentioned above, the area of marginal employment (mini- and midi-jobs) has 
also been transformed by the Hartz legislation. Different objectives were envisaged with 
these reforms: the curtailment of illegal work, especially in private households, and the 
strengthening of marginal employment as a stepping stone to regular jobs (BMWA 
2003, p. 4; Bundesregierung 2003, pp. 2–4). As part of the reform, the 15-hour limit on 
weekly working hours has been abolished. Hence, marginal employment can be carried 
out in addition to regular employment without becoming subject to social security con-
tributions. 
Prior to the latest reforms, full social insurance contributions became mandatory on 
passing the € 325 income limit. Now employees’ contributions amount to 4 percent of 
their earnings when they earn at least € 400.01. For incomes between € 400 and € 800, 
contributions increase linearly until hitting the regular rate of 21 percent. Meanwhile, 
full social insurance entitlements are gained. Employers are compelled to making full 
contributions for mini-jobs, usually amounting to 25 percent (Rudolph 2003; Osch-
miansky 2004). As a result, employers might theoretically be inclined to transform 
mini-jobs into midi-jobs. 
The overall evaluation of marginal employment by employer representatives turns 
out positively. Mini-jobs, especially, are recognised as a cost-efficient and very flexible 
measure for dealing with peak periods and extended opening hours. In this context, 
competitive branches such as retail, cleaning, catering and tourism, but also private 
households, take advantage of this measure. In particular, small businesses appreciate 
the aspect of flexible and rapid use of marginal employment at relatively low costs 
(Fertig and Friedrich 2005, pp. 129–130). Whereas these aspects already existed before 
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jobbers and thus helped to strengthen internal numerical flexibility. The doubling of 
declared marginal employment in private households within one year is an indicator of 
the success of this strategy. 
From the employees’ and trade unions’ point of view, however, there is great con-
cern about mini-jobs offering employers the possibility to substitute regular employ-
ment and to keep outsiders in a low-income and dead-end trap which eventually also 
leads to low social security entitlements and poverty in old age. Midi-jobs, on the other 
hand, lead to a somewhat higher share of upward transitions, but too few people are 
engaged in this type of employment relationship. Furthermore, as mentioned above, 
midi-jobs are for the most part carried out by women (in 2006, 75 percent of all midi-
jobbers were women). The outcome, thus, is ambivalent. Marginal employment today 
enables many mothers to combine paid and unpaid family work, but at the same time 
counteracts principles of ‘gender mainstreaming’ and sustainable individual security 
entitlements. 
(3) The first part of the administrative reforms can be subsumed under the strategy to 
activate the unemployed by ‘supporting and demanding’ (‘Fördern und Fordern’) 
measures. The supporting measures were mainly the improvement of placement ser-
vices, especially through a larger and better-trained staff responsible for placement 
services and employment promotion. The demanding measures mainly consisted in 
tightening the rules on accepting a ‘suitable’ job and in reducing unemployment bene-
fits for older people. In this context, it should be noted that prior to the Hartz reforms, 
older employees were eligible for wage-related benefits for up to 32 months. As a con-
sequence of this particular legal condition, employers frequently made use of the 
‘golden handshake’-option, thus shifting their older employees into early retirement. 
Such arrangements were facilitated by the pension system, which allowed retirement at 
the age of 60 without a corresponding actuarial reduction of pension benefits. Both rules 
were adjusted: the duration of unemployment benefits was cut to 12 months, or to 18 
months for people aged older than 55 years. Furthermore, in cases of early retirement, 
the pension regulations now foresee an actuarial reduction of benefits. It is – at least 
partly – due to these new regulations that in the course of the economic upswing the 
employment rates of elderly employees have risen, while their unemployment rates 
have decreased significantly. 
(4) Profiling is used to divide jobseekers into client groups (job-ready, counselling, and 
intensive-service  clients) according to their distance from the labour market. The 
classification of the clients serves as a basis for individual action plans and for allo-
cating labour market services. The clients’ streamlining is organised according to strict 
schedules in order to ensure individualised counselling and to avoid waiting queues. 
These measures have certainly improved the lot of the first two groups. The ‘intensive-
service clients’, however, are even more neglected than before. 
(5) Services to employers are improved through time-budget allocation for such services 
(at least 20 percent of the agencies’ time) and ‘premium’ clients, faster reaction times, 
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fied contacts, follow-up contacts, an improved vacancy data base and monitoring of the 
matching process. The central goal lies in obtaining employers’ attention and willing-
ness to cooperate and, thus, in increasing the share of notified vacancies. These meas-
ures have also considerably improved matching efficiency. 
(6) The reform also puts emphasis on privatisation in the form of outside provision of 
placement services. Most of the corresponding instruments, however, especially the Per-
sonnel Service Agencies (PSA), have not been successful (Hess et al. 2006). PSAs are 
temporary work agencies for the unemployed established on a contract basis with a 
local service provider, which is in many cases part of the temporary work industry. This 
instrument, however, has failed to live up to the Hartz Commission’s great expectations, 
mainly because the amalgamation of placement and temporary work functions sent 
ambivalent signals to both the PES agencies and their clients. After a process of learn-
ing and calibration, the instrument of issuing placement vouchers to persons who had 
been unemployed for more than six weeks turned out to be partially successful. Private 
agencies are paid a maximum of € 2,000 for placing the unemployed person in employ-
ment of at least 15 hours per week: € 1,000 after employment duration of at least six 
weeks and an additional € 1,000 after duration of at least six months. 
(7) The main, albeit ambivalent, impact was due to the merging of unemployment as-
sistance and social assistance. Prior to the reform, the PES administered two types of 
benefits, which de facto defined its clientele for active measures: unemployment bene-
fits, which provided payments at a level of about two thirds of previous net wages for 12 
months (or up to 32 months for older employees), and unemployment assistance after 
eligibility for regular unemployment benefits had expired. Unlike unemployment bene-
fits, unemployment assistance was means-tested, amounted to 53 percent to 57 percent 
of previous net wages, and was paid for an unlimited period. A third type of benefit was 
the so-called social assistance, in other words, means-tested benefits at the subsistence 
level. Social assistance for unemployed people who were not eligible for PES benefits 
was funded and administered by the local authorities, the counties and the larger muni-
cipalities. On average, about 80 percent of total social assistance expenditure was 
funded by the local authorities, while the remaining 20 percent was funded by the Ger-
man federal states (Länder). 
The unlimited allowance of means-tested, yet wage-related, unemployment assistance 
turned out to have negative effects on work incentives, especially for those unemployed 
with relatively high prior earnings. As mentioned above, this regulation also encouraged 
the use of ‘golden handshake’ options. Moreover, the elaborate system of benefit pro-
vision had important consequences for the provision of job-brokering and other active 
measures for the unemployed in Germany. 
First, more and more unemployed were no longer eligible for regular unemploy-
ment benefits, rather only for means-tested unemployment assistance or social assist-
ance. Second, the PES focused its active programmes de facto on its own core clientele 
of unemployment benefit recipients, who were getting funded through the PES budget; 
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PES, but financed by the national government, or had to apply to the local authorities 
for social assistance; recipients of social assistance administered by the local authorities 
and other unemployed persons not eligible for PES benefits were generally excluded 
from PES active programmes. Third, as a response to the unemployed who depended on 
social assistance, local labour market programmes for long-term unemployed were 
mushrooming under the auspices of the local authorities. Fourth, many of these local 
programmes were explicitly aimed at shifting the unemployed back under the responsi-
bility of the PES; this was possible by creating intermediary jobs lasting up to 12 
months, thereby entitling the participants to re-gain eligibility for unemployment 
benefits and thereafter unlimited unemployment assistance. In the end, the losers of this 
shifting of responsibilities (labelled by some experts as ‘organised irresponsibility’) 
were the long-term unemployed, especially low-skilled and older people, which was 
reflected in over-proportional unemployment rates in these target groups. 
The Hartz reforms overhauled this highly flawed incentive system by replacing 
unemployment assistance with a so-called ‘basic (income) security’ (Grundsicherung or 
Arbeitslosengeld II [ALG II]). ALG II is a means-tested and flat-rate allowance for all 
jobseekers who are not entitled to unemployment benefits, no matter whether they are 
clients of the local authorities (formerly social assistance recipients) or clients of the 
PES (formerly unemployment benefit recipients).  
The administrative reform, however, was not successful in establishing correspond-
ing ‘job centres’ or one-stop shops for all of the clients under the clear responsibility of 
the PES, as the Hartz Commission had recommended. Due to the complex interrelation-
ships under German federalism and a political stalemate between the leading parties, a 
compromise emerged which again established fragmented responsibilities between the 
PES and the local authorities with respect to the recipients of ‘basic security’ – so-called 
Hartz IV. 
For a needy single unemployed person, Hartz IV (since July 2007) pays an allow-
ance of € 347 plus costs for accommodation (about € 320). In the case of a family, 
unemployed partners receive 90 percent (€ 320) of the basic allowance (€ 347), children 
under the age of 14 receive 60 percent (€ 277), and children from 15 to 18 years receive 
80 percent. Furthermore, all ‘basic security’ recipients are entitled to active labour mar-
ket policy – almost to the same extent as recipients of regular unemployment benefits. 
Thus, a family with two children aged 15 and 17, and in which both partners are 
unemployed and have passed the means test, receives a transfer income of at least € 347 
+ 320 + 277 + 277 = € 1,220; this corresponds to a gross wage of about € 8.60 per hour. 
Under certain circumstances, additional allowances can increase the amount of the 
transfer income. The transfer recipients can also earn some additional income up to a 
certain amount. As a result, incentives to work for low-income earners turn out to be 
rather low or even negative.  
Taken all together, this element of the Hartz reforms created losers as well as 
winners. The losers are mainly relatively well-paid former unemployment assistance 
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eligible for active labour market policy measures. 
For the time being, there are at least four unresolved problems: first, the problem of 
long-term unemployed who are disadvantaged either by age, low skills or limited work 
capacities; second, the depressed employment rate of low-skilled people, which is 
reflected on the other side of the coin by increasing informal or even illegal (‘black’) 
work; third, the growing problem of the working poor, whose earnings (often despite 
full-time work) fall below the minimum income and who therefore receive ‘basic secur-
ity’ to top up their incomes; fourth, the problem of the older unemployed who, after 12 
or 18 months, end up in the potential poverty trap of Hartz IV. Recently, there was a 
heated debate on this latter problem. It was argued that people who had made con-
tributions to the unemployment insurance system over many years should be eligible for 
benefits for an extended period of time. The debate resulted in an agreement by the 
current Grand Coalition government to further extend the benefit duration for older 
unemployed to two years. The likely impact of this decision, however, is ambivalent. 
Extending benefits for older recipients goes against the logic of insurance and might 
again increase incentives to enter early retirement. There is not much evidence that mar-
ginally changing one single element in the package of employment policies actually 
contributes to either increasing employment or to decreasing unemployment. The story 
told so far should have shown that it is the interaction between complementary insti-
tutions that is responsible for sustainable employment dynamics. The final section will 
deliberate on this point on a more general level. 
 
 
5.  Lesson to be learned from recent German labour market reforms 
Having reviewed some theoretical foundations as well as the current policy reforms, the 
remainder of this paper will seek to identify a set of lessons to be derived from the Ger-
man experience. What are the major insights yielded by our analysis? Which parts of 
the reform can be viewed as successful? What, on the other hand, went wrong? In the 
following, we briefly sketch the positive and negative aspects of the reforms.  
The first good practice that deserves mention is promoting the transition from un-
employment to employment through self-employment as a stepping stone to entrepre-
neurship or back to gainful dependent work. We believe – apart from the general lesson 
– that developing countries, especially, that are faced with the problem of transforming 
informal employment into formal employment can learn much by studying the strengths 
and weaknesses of this programme. Evaluation research, for instance, showed that 
follow-up measures in terms of counselling, networking, training, marketing and, es-
pecially, a proper financing infrastructure are of utmost importance for the sustainability 
of self-employment. 
The second good practice is the successful modernisation of placement services in 
Germany. Evaluation research indicates especially the importance of early assessment 
of the skills and competences of jobseekers, individual case management, the availabil-
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strong employer orientation of placement officers. 
The third lesson in this respect – and this also corresponds to experiences in the 
Netherlands, the UK and Australia – is that privatisation is not a panacea for improved 
employment services. Transaction costs can be prohibitive, and the oft-detected lack of 
quality in private services is a warning against placing exaggerated hope in privatisation 
or in contracting out these services. Nevertheless, on a general level, Germany in this 
respect also teaches that proper public-private partnership arrangements can serve to 
bring even the most disadvantaged people back into the labour market. It takes a long 
time to create a competitive market of high-quality private employment services. In 
view of state or policy failures that also loom large compared to market failures, it is 
worthwhile investing much in the framework conditions of excellent private providers 
of employment services. 
The fourth – at least partly – positive example is the flexibilisation of the labour 
market through mini-jobs and midi-jobs that serve, metaphorically speaking, to ‘grease 
the wheels’ of the labour market. Also, the partial deregulation of temp-agency work, 
on the one hand, and the submission of these hybrid employment relationships to the 
law of collective agreement, on the other, has increased the status of potentially modern 
employment relationships. However, we also noticed substantial risks related to this 
kind of flexibilisation if it is not combined with new securities, for instance active 
labour market policies supporting transitions into regular or stable employment relation-
ships, tax and social security provisions avoiding gender discrimination, and substi-
tution of regular employment through dumping of wage and labour standards. Despite 
the success, it is therefore beyond dispute that the reforms have also brought about dis-
appointment and failure. Since these failures might perhaps have even more to teach us 
than the successes, the final section will sum up the main mistakes. 
The most prominent mistake of the Hartz reforms is the failure to establish trans-
parent administrative structures for integrating the long-term unemployed. The present 
lack of institutional accountability is one of the main reasons why hard-to-place people 
are clearly disadvantaged in the present system. The second big mistake was reducing 
investments in active labour market policy, especially in continuous vocational educa-
tion and training, not only for the unemployed, but also for the low-skilled employed 
facing high unemployment risks. A third failure was the late response to the lack of 
effective demand related to public investment and stimulating private investment. Only 
the Grand Coalition succeeded in turning the steering wheel toward stimulating the eco-
nomy through a huge investment programme of € 25 billion.
16 The fourth mistake and 
major future challenge for reforms seeking stimulate a sustainable employment dynamic 
is the funding of the welfare state. The burden on employees’ income is still too large, 
especially with regard to low and medium income-earners. In order to make work pay, 
the financing of social security has to be shifted more in the direction of consumption 
                                                 
16  For more details on this point, see several contributions in Schettkat and Langkau (2007). 
  22 taxes or general income taxes, including higher effective taxation of properties or un-
invested capital. 
In the long run, the modern world of work requires a new full employment goal 
which is no longer based on permanent full-time work over the whole life course, but on 
flexible employment relationships that allow transitions between various jobs, variable 
working-time regimes and changing forms of employment. The proper institutional 
change would be to transform unemployment insurance into employment insurance, 
covering not only the income risks of unemployment but also the income risks of 
changing employment relationships during the life course, and thus, making transitions 
pay (Schmid forthcoming). 
Finally and returning to the analytical framework, the central message of our essay 
is simple and threefold. First, prior to superficially linking empirical observations to 
institutions or policies in a causally relevant way, it is important to get the empirical 
facts right by identifying exogenous and endogenous factors that determine employ-
ment, and to evaluate institutions and policy measures with rigorous methods before 
eventually drawing tentative policy conclusions on the basis of a rich set of circum-
stantial evidence. Second, theory suggests that successful employment strategies depend 
on the proper interaction between institutions that influence employability on the supply 
side and productivity on the demand side. Employability obviously depends above all 
on education & skills, but less obviously, and more controversially, also on social secur-
ity and employment protection. Productivity evidently depends on technology & capital, 
but less obviously, and more controversially, on effective demand and employment 
regulation. Third, the empirical evidence of the German case supports our starting pro-
position that neither regulation nor the deregulation theory provide a proper framework 
for explaining employment dynamics. It is instead the complementarity of institutions 
that enhances flexibility and security in employment relationships, on the one hand, and 
stimulates the economy through product innovation and human capital investment, on 
the other. 
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  26 Figure 3:  Unemployment rates by level of education, 2005 
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  27Figure 5:  Standard and non-standard employment 
 




































2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 
 
Sources: Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Beschäftigung in Deutschland, Tabelle 1; IAB. Daten zur 
kurzfristigen Entwicklung von Wirtschaft und Arbeitsmarkt, September 2007, S. 18; European Union 
Labour Force Survey. 
 





































Marginally employed in side job* Exclusively marginally employed*
Employees holding Midi-Jobs**
*   Marginal employment refers to employment relations with monthly earnings up to € 400.
** Midi-Jobs are employment relationships with monthly earnings between € 400 and € 800
    and are subject to social security contributions.  
Sources: Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Nuremberg 2007; Arbeitsmarkt in Zahlen, Beschäftigte 
Ende Dezember 2006 in Deutschland; Bundesagentur für Arbeit: Mini- und Midijobs in Deutschland. 
Bericht der Statistik der BA. Nuremberg, May 2007. 
 
  29Table 1: Raw data for measuring the employment performance in Germany, comparing 
the upswings 1998–2000 and 2005–2007 
 
  1998 1999 2000 
GDP (in €)  1,965,380,000,000  2,012,000,000,000  2,062,500,000,000 
Resident 
population (P) 
82,029,000 82,087,000 82,188,000 
Hours worked (H)  56,992,000,000  57,317,000,000  57,659,000,000 
Employed 
persons (E) 
37,911,000 38,424,000 39,144,000 
Working age 
population (WAP) 
55,990,000 55,915,000 55,788,000 
Unemployed 
persons (U) 
4,280,630 4,100,499 3,889,695 
  2005 2006 2007 
GDP (in €)  2,241,000,000,000  2,309,100,000,000  2,371,445,700,000 
Resident 
population (P) 
82,464,000 82,366,000 82,197,000 
Hours worked (H)  55,740,000,000  56,001,000,000  55,876,000,000 
Employed 
persons (E) 
38,823,000 39,090,000 39,769,000 
Working age 
population (WAP) 
54,918,000 54,574,000 53,515,000 
Unemployed 
persons (U) 
4,860,877 4,487,057 3,783,000 
 
   1998 1999 2000 2005 2006 2007 
GDP/P  23,960 24,511 25,095 27,175 28,035 28,851 
GDP/H  34.49 35.10 35.77 40.20 41.23 42.44 
H/E  1,503 1,492 1,473 1,436 1,433 1,405 
E/WAP  0.6771 0.6872 0.7017 0.7069 0.7163 0.7431 
WAP/P  0.6826 0.6812 0.6788 0.6660 0.6626 0.6511 
E/(E+U)  0.8985 0.9036 0.9096 0.8887 0.8970 0.9131 
(E+U)/WAP  0.7536 0.7605 0.7714 0.7954 0.7985 0.8138 
H/P  695 698 702 676 680 680 
Main sources: Sachverständigenrat (2007), Statistisches Bundesamt (2006, 2007). 
  30 Table 2: Decomposition of per capita GDP (GDP/P) into indicators of efficiency, 
work sharing, labour market integration and population structure in 1998, 
1999, 2000, 2005, 2006 and 2007 
    
  GDP/P 
  
=  GDP/H  * H/E *  E/WAP  +  WAP/P 
 
1998  23,960  = 34.49 * 1,503 *  0.6771  *  0.6826 
1999  24,511  = 35.10 * 1,492 *  0.6872  *  0.6812 
2000  25,095  = 35.77 * 1,473 *  0.7017  *  0.6788 
2005  27,175  = 40.20 * 1,436 *  0.7069  *  0.6660 
2006  28,035  = 41.23 * 1,433 *  0.7163  *  0.6626 
2007  28,851 
  
= 42.44 * 1,405 *  0.7431  *  0.6511 
 
GDP/P   GDP per capita 
GDP/H   GDP per hour 
H/E    Working time per employed person 
E/WAP   Employment rate 
WAP/P   Demographic component (working age population related to total population) 
Main sources: Sachverständigenrat (2007), Statistisches Bundesamt (2006, 2007); authors’ 
calculations. 
 
Table 3: Decomposition of per capita working time (H/P) into indicators of working 
time preference, utilisation of the work force, labour market inclusivenes 
and demographic structure in 1998, 1999, 2000, 2005, 2006 and 2007 
    
  H/P    
= H/E *  E/(E+U)  *  (E+U)/WAP  *  WAP/P   
1998  695  = 1,503 * 0.899 * 0.754 * 0.683 
1999  698  = 1,492 * 0.904 * 0.761 * 0.681 
2000  702  = 1,473 * 0.910 * 0.771 * 0.679 
2005  676  = 1,436 * 0.889 * 0.795 * 0.666 
2006  680  = 1,433 * 0.897 * 0.798 * 0.663 
= 1,405 * 0.913 * 0.814 * 0.651  2007  680 
    
H/P    Working time per capita 
H/E    Working time per employed person 
E/(E+U)  Labour force utilisation 
(E+U)/WAP  Labour force participation rate 
WAP/P    Demographic component (working age population related to total population) 
Main sources: Sachverständigenrat (2007), Statistisches Bundesamt (2006, 2007); authors’ 
calculations. 
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